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iAbstract 
The Meta-Disciplinary Rhetoric of Metabiology: Reconsidering the Role 
of Disciplinarity in Rhetorical Stagings of Scientific Controversies 
Andrew Jacob Heermans, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
Supervisor: Davida Charney 
This project interrogates how scholars in the rhetoric of science understand and stage 
controversies within scientific discourse communities. In the paper, I argue that scholarship in the 
rhetoric of science does not offer a consistent theoretical framework for addressing disciplinary 
interactions that take rhetorical advantage of extant connections between disparate 
fields/disciplines to render one discipline in terms of another at the ontological or essential level. 
By offering an extended rhetorical analysis of one such case, Gregory Chaitin’s “Metabiology”, I 
argue that this kind of disciplinary interaction has significant rhetorical import for scholars 
addressing scientific conversations and the controversies that unfold, but are also at work within 
the scientific pre-stagings themselves. Distinguishing between intra-disciplinary, inter-
disciplinary, and finally meta-disciplinary stagings of scientific controversies within rhetoric of 
science literature, this paper offers a provisional heuristic that aims to refine how scholars in 
rhetoric approach scientific controversies as being already-scientifically distinct from other 
controversies, yet somehow explanatorily amenable to rhetorical analysis. Recent scholarship has 
indicated that this is a broadly unaccounted for duplicity within the extant rhetoric of science 
literature’s and my paper argues that Chaitin’s project of Metabiology offers an honest animation 
of a post-incommensurability rhetoric that, perhaps through theoretical and methodological 
projections of inter-disciplinarity as an end in itself, results in a disciplinary hierarchy that does 
more rhetorical violence than intra- or inter-disciplinary frameworks would let on. 
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The Meta-Disciplinary Rhetoric of Metabiology: Reconsidering the Role of 





The Controversy of Controversies 
 
What distinguishes, if anything, a “scientific controversy” from the arguments and 
debates of the layman? In their recent paper, There’s No Such Thing as a Scientific 
Controversy, Scott Graham and Linda Walsh argue that in general, moments when 
scientists appear prompted to persuasively negotiate how their work is received either 
within or across scientific disciplines/fields, have been used by rhetoric of science 
scholars to render (or produce) “rhetorical and political dynamics of science that would 
otherwise remain invisible.” (Graham & Walsh, 1). Despite this valuable function, 
Graham and Walsh argue that there are unaccounted for rhetorical features/functions in 
the various uses of the term “scientific controversy”, particular “backstage demarcations” 
that uncritically and a priori accept the demarcation claims of scientific discourses 
themselves, leading to a “rhetorical engine that will accept only scientific values as 
warrants for ending (a) controversy” (24). Such backstage rhetorics of demarcation, 
Graham and Walsh argue, have led to a presumption that there is something different and 
special about scientific rather than normal controversies and that this is accessible and 
accountable for and by rhetorical analysis. In other words, the privileging of scientific 
controversies in the rhetoric of science can often ‘sneak in’ the authoritative rhetoric in 
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scientific discourses to (paradoxically) justify and render exigent the need of rhetoric to 
clarify or enable communication within a given scientific discourse setting, where 
persuasion or consensus is not being achieved.  
One example they give is that throughout Rhetoric and Incommensurability, (Harris, 
2005), a collection of essays by rhetoricians on the topics of incommensurability and 
scientific controversies, Graham and Walsh identified only one of the 11 authors, Alan 
Gross, who, rather than treating controversies as “historical faits accomplis even while 
stressing the(ir) rhetoricity”, argued “that declaring something a “scientific controversy” 
was, in itself, an essentially rhetorical move” (2). In the article, Graham and Walsh detail 
the findings from a study that assessed 137 articles (from 23 journals) in the rhetoric of 
science, and found 81 instances of articles dealing with “scientific controversies” that 
were “most frequently staged as paradigm revolutions, explicitly in a Kuhnian idiom” (7), 
citing Darwinian evolution, punctuated equilibria, sociobiology, oxygen chemistry, and 
ecotoxicology as “prototypical exemplars” taken up in rhetoric of science scholarship. 
Crucially, such “Kuhnian” stagings of scientific controversies will contain or deploy 
some notion of incommensurability to present or indicate (if only to resolve) a lack of 
consensus among thinkers, theories or paradigms. Graham and Walsh’s study indicates 
further that “situational analyses of “scientific controversies” in (their) sample staged 
them as functions of incommensurability---diachronic and synchronic---generally without 




Harris’s Typology of Incommensurability 
The distinction between diachronic and synchronic kinds of incommensurability 
Graham and Walsh use is from Randy Allen Harris’s “incommensurability suite”, a 
typology of incommensurability developed in his introduction to the aforementioned 
collection Rhetoric and Incommensurability. Harris charts the influence that notions of 
incommensurability, developed largely by (Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend), have 
had upon the field of rhetoric in general, and the rhetoric of science in particular. 
Speaking of the broader “rhetorical turn” that inaugurated what now comprises the sub-
discipline rhetoric of science, Harris argues that while “no single concept can be charged 
for the general movement (the “rhetorical turn”) or the specific sub-field (rhetoric of 
science)... if we wanted to choose only one, as a metonym for all of the issues and 
interests feeding into the rhetorical investigation, the hands down winner would be 
incommensurability.” (96). In other words, rhetoric generally treats incommensurability 
is the sine qua non of a scientific controversy, as well as for the need or amenability of 
rhetoric to intervene upon disputes surrounding scientific theories and between scientific 
disciplines. However, as the nearly book-length introduction to the collection 
demonstrates, there is no single, simple definition or deployment of the term 
“incommensurability” in rhetoric of science scholarship (and for that matter, even in the 
work of Kuhn and Feyerabend), but rather a constellation of distinct yet overlapping 
usages of the term.  
Harris identifies two distinct ways in which “the word is deployed in the relevant 
discourses influenced by Feyerabend’s and Kuhn’s introduction of the term—one 
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categorical, one graduated.” (21). In terms of the categorical deployment, Harris defines 
four “species” or categories of incommensurability: brick-wall incommensurability, 
cosmic incommensurability, semantic incommensurability and pragmatic 
incommensurability. Brick-wall incommensurability “labels situations in which 
hopelessly stymied, where each party can only hear gibberish”, cosmic “labels a situation 
in which communication is severely hindered because of different perceptions of the 
“same” phenomena”, while semantic labels situations wherein communication is 
complicated because “clusters of meanings used by the parties are out of synch (with 
each other)”, and pragmatic labels “a situation in which argumentation is rendered very 
difficult because themes and practices are out of synch” (22) because there are different 
values being appealed to, “often covertly and vaguely” (22).  
The second model of incommensurability Harris identifies is complementary to 
the first, described as a kind of metaphorical thermometer that identifies “degrees, rather 
than categories, of incommensurability---a scale that runs from total homogeneity of 
paired symbolic networks (theories, languages, worldviews) to total heterogeneity.” (23). 
For Harris, the scale from high to low efficiently maps onto the categorical approach, as 
“neither model works sufficiently on its own” because “the type of incommensurability 
may often be much less important than the amount” (23). 
 The final critical facet of incommensurability that for Harris defines how the term is 
used in the rhetoric of science (though as we shall see, not necessarily accounted for or 
explicated by rhetoric of science scholars themselves), the dimension of “temporal 
proximity” which Harris models through the Saussurean terms diachronic and 
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synchronic. This facet of incommensurability concerns the question of populations, aims 
to answer the question of “incommensurability between whom?”, and the linguistic 
analogy maps cleanly onto his other approach, where incommensurability across time 
(diachronic) “tend(s) to correlate with high readings on our incommensurometer” (24), 
while synchronic incommensurability, “when two programs are on the disciplinary table 
at the same time” (23) tends to correlate with lower readings, at the semantic level rather 
than the high-degree cosmic category.  
 
Towards the Question of Disciplinarity 
In their study of scientific controversies, Graham and Walsh apply Harris’s suite 
to articulate the differences among usages of the term “scientific controversies”, finding 
in instances of both synchronic and diachronic incommensurability a compensatory 
presumption of dialectical, rational resolution or closure available through rhetorical 
means. It is important to note that the dialectical nature of these staging demand the 
presence of bifurcated parties, be they individuals or disciplinary communities, which 
inaugurate the crucial “boundary work” that presumably requires participants in the 
controversy to use rhetoric to achieve consensus. Graham and Walsh identify two 
primary forms of boundary work staged throughout the literature: demarcation, “designed 
to fence participants out in order to simplify and speed closure of a dispute”, and 
translation, “designed to create unity between diverse communities and worldviews” 
(18). In both cases, the authors argue, there is a “dialectical model of controversy 
resolution” (19), an expectation that the controversy will close or resolve inevitably, 
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rationally and dialectically. They conclude the paper by arguing that to some degree “all 
controversies are the results of rhetorics of demarcation” (24), and that the difference 
between “scientific” and other controversies that the rhetoric of science implies arises 
from treating of boundaries1 “as prior to the analysis rather than contingent and strategic 
articulations by not only the participants in the controversies but also the critics analyzing 
them” (23), meaning rhetoricians of science “tacitly privilege, a priori, scientists’ 
demarcation claims” (24).  
In this paper I argue that an important component underlying the demarcations 
within so-called scientific controversies that needs further analysis is that of 
disciplinarity. A crucial component of the demarcation rhetorics that Graham and Walsh 
identify as being inherited or recapitulated by rhetoric of science stagings, I argue, is the 
way in which a scientific field or sub-discipline attempts to stabilize its own disciplinary 
autonomy through epistemic boundaries and methodological prescriptions, and how this 
in turn influences interactions across disciplines, be they competitive or cooperative. I am 
proposing a theoretical framework that focuses particularly on the disciplinary 
boundaries presented in rhetorical stagings of scientific controversies. I argue that 
rhetoric of science scholarship has historically emphasized what I am calling intra- and 
                                               
1 Graham and Walsh’s analysis of the literature’s orientation to scientific controversies offer a substantive 
validation of the criticisms Randy Allen Harris made in the introduction to his edited collection, Landmark 
Essays on Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies, published in 1997. Under the section “Conflict in Science”, 
Harris argues that while “the rhetorical study of scientific conflicts grew naturally from the Kuhnian roots 
of rhetoric of science, with its emphasis on upheaval and revolution…none of the scientific debates 
investigated rhetorically (in this volume or elsewhere) are truly revolutionary” (xxxii). Harris goes on to 
say that while “some rhetoricians have brushed up against revolutions—Campbell’s work on the natural 
selection controversy, Gross’s and Bazerman’s on the corpuscular light controversy, Gross’s on the 
heliocentric revolution—these studies are invariably sympathetic with only one side, and always the 
winning side at that” (xxxii). 
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inter-disciplinary stagings, but the literature does not present or prescribe a stable 
conceptual treatment of controversies that arise at what I argue is best considered the 
meta-disciplinary level of relational interaction or staging. What is indicated by the label 
of meta-disciplinary are moments when a perceived likeness across disciplines moves 
from the status of a rhetorical figure which may characterize a methodological implement 
or an epistemological goal, to a primary status as ontology, rendering one field as 
philosophically prior to another in a manner that preemptively forecloses the kinds of 
incommensurability encountered in intra/inter-disciplinary controversies, but does so by 
paradoxically and violently inaugurating a new relation of “togetherness-in-sameness”.  
The case I will be using to exemplify this meta-disciplinary kind of controversy is 
“Metabiology”, an emergent field of study proposed by mathematician Gregory Chaitin 
which aims to find “a sufficiently rich mathematical space to model the space of all 
possible designs for biological organisms, to model biological creativity”, by developing 
a model “sufficiently simple to permit rigorous proofs or at least heuristic arguments as 
convincing as those that are employed in theoretical physics”2. The ambiguity and 
tension in Metabiology’s seemingly simultaneous status as both an experimental toy-
model and a metaphysical affirmation (of a controversial equivocation of biological and 
mathematical ontologies), has led to a meta-disciplinary controversy about the 
relationship between pure mathematics and biology. By indicating a “meta-disciplinarily” 
staged controversy, I hope to offer the rhetoric of science a way of approaching questions 
                                               
2 Chaitin, Metaphysics, Mathematics and Metabiology, 2011, pg.7.  
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of scientific imperialism and disciplinary autonomy through an analysis of the meta-
disciplinary features of Gregory Chaitin’s mathematical foray into theoretical biology.  
 
 
II. Intra-disciplinary and Inter-disciplinary Stagings 
 
Randy Allen Harris argues that two primary claims underwrote the development 
of the rhetoric of science in the 1970s, firstly that “science is not solely the province of 
individuals with beakers or telescopes or accelerator photographs, but of communities 
with conferences, journals, values, and goals”, and secondly that “there is no single 
scientific method, but a (constrained) plurality of approaches, or styles, that differ from 
science to science, program to program, community to community, all of them 
powerfully mediated by language” (xvi). These claims, Harris argues, lead to the crucial 
implication that “the virtues of a scientific claim come not only from the way it is 
mapped against nature, but from the way it is mapped into the context of specific 
approaches and communities” (xvi). I am arguing that in general approaches indicate an 
intra-disciplinary emphasis, while communities indicate an intra-disciplinary emphasis.   
 
Intra-disciplinarity 
  Stagings of intra-disciplinary conflicts can be characterized by moments where 
different epistemologies and/or methodologies compete within the same field or 
discipline for the status of proof: what counts as evidence is questioned in relation to 
shared intellectual goals within a disciplinary boundary. This kind of controversy is a 
 9 
frequent subject of rhetoric of science scholarship, where a “disciplinary stalemate” has 
developed due to lack of consensus regarding particular methods of accomplishing a 
consensual goal. Intra-disciplinary controversies such as Watson & Crick’s attempting 
the goal (among many others in their and related fields) of finding the physical structure 
of DNA (Bazerman, Gross, Halloran), controversies amongst archeologists regarding 
what counts as evidence for determining when and how humans first came to the 
Americas (Fahnestock), the interpretation of data surrounding parthenogenesis 
reproduction in amphibians (Myers), and the controversy surrounding punctuated 
equilibrium and adaptationism within evolutionary biology (Selzer et al.), are but a few 
of many available examples in the rhetoric of science. In terms of Harris’s 
incommensurability suite, these are generally associable with synchronic, semantic-
pragmatic, and relatively low levels of incommensurability. While in general it is more 
likely for an intra-disciplinary staging to be given “among discourse communities or 
argument spheres at the same time” (Graham & Walsh, 12), it is not always the case that 
paradigmatic concerns or cosmic features (worldviews or philosophical axioms) are 
shared across disputants within the same field or discipline.  
The case of Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge’s concept of punctuated 
equilibria proposed in 1972 indicates a controversy within evolutionary biology (though 
both Gould and Eldredge were both paleontologists and evolutionary biologists) that 
involved the epistemological status of fossil evidence  for the field of evolutionary 
biology (and thus the methodological approach to), indicating a primarily intra-
disciplinary conflict. However, Graham and Walsh indicate in their analysis of Lyne and 
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Howe’s (1997) and Zagacki & Keith’s (1992) essays on the controversy, the stagings of 
the controversy an undeniably diachronic and both employ varying degrees of “old-guard 
vs. rebel paradigm” diachronic ontologies of incommensurability. This observation 
suggests that the question of disciplinary staging is to some extent separable form the 
question of diachronic/synchronic incommensurability, and this is further evidenced by 
Graham and Walsh’s concusions that these senses of incommensurability are often 
amenable to the rhetorical choices in staging themselves.  
 
Inter-disciplinarity 
Where intra-disciplinary stagings generally show a scientific field with a shared 
intellectual goal debate over the means by which said goal be can properly accomplished, 
inter-disciplinary-staged controversies concern the potential value of combining distinct 
fields, or putting distinct fields into conversation for the benefit of one or both fields. 
Rhetoricians have studied and theorized a number of moments of scientific controversy, 
where an emphasis is placed on the discursive and conceptual tensions arising when one 
field interacts with another field. In terms of incommensurability, it is argued here that 
the incommensurability of inter-disciplinary conflicts can be pragmatic, semantic, even 
cosmic, and more frequently than typically synchronic intra-disciplinary conflicts, inter-
disciplinary structurings can locate the incommensurability in the tension between older 
and newer fields and outgrowths from within fields, so paradigmatic concerns are further 
implicated. 
 11 
One example of this mode of inquiry is found in Ann M. Blakeslee’s Interacting 
with Audiences. The book focuses on a single case of inter-disciplinary controversy, one 
in which physicists were attempting to persuade chemists and biologists that they had 
found a more efficient and reliable method for modeling biological molecules via 
computer simulation than the method preferred by chemists and biologists. While 
chemists and biologists championed the method of Molecular Dynamics (MD), physicists 
argued that a new method called Dynamically Optimized Monte Carlo (DOMC) was 
preferable to MD, claiming that DOMC was more efficient and flexible, allowing the 
simulation of smaller molecules and their properties using less computer energy and time 
than MD. The preference physicists had in moving from smaller to larger molecule 
simulation was not shared or practiced by chemists and biologists, according to the 
physicists, and so represents an inter rather than intra-disciplinary controversy, evidenced 
in a quote from a physicist: “You have to start out small and simple. That’s the way it’s 
done in the physics community. There is a tendency among (biologists, chemists) to go 
right after the big stuff, not mess around with the small stuff.” (25). These disciplinary 
differences, Blakeslee argues, were the primary factors informing the rhetorical 
challenges the physicists faced in persuading their audience of chemists and biologists to 
adopt the DOMC method of simulation. The physicists’ training was oriented towards 
general simulation of physical objects and not biological molecules in particular, and the 
biologists’ interest in and use of computer simulation of physical objects was specific to 
the broader interests of their fields, there was an inter-disciplinary conflict which 
demanded, according to Blakeslee, much rhetorical sensitivity to their audiences as 
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outsiders entering distinct fields with generally divergent intellectual goals than their 
own, even though they were in this situation focusing on a shared goal of modeling 
biomolecules. In other words, while the controversy itself centered on a methodological 
dispute surrounding a shared goal, the source of this controversy came out of larger 
differences across the disciplines themselves, which we can take as being inter-
disciplinary in nature. Further, Blakeslee's analysis indicates that the strictly empirical 
facets of the physicists' arguments for DOMC, for example the reduced computational 
burden (in terms of electricity and time required) and the increased accuracy of 
simulation, were not enough on their own to persuade chemists and biologists to adopt 
the new methods, and required rhetorical appeals which took into account both the 
familiarity of the standard MD method to the other fields and fields' different sizes of  
molecules preferably simulate. In general, inter-disciplinary stagings often treat a 
controversy as arising through the resultant tensions between distinct fields that come 
into contact for a particular shared or mutually beneficial goal. Rhetorical scholars in 
these stagings often treat the social dimensions of text composition within given 
disciplines as a whole, as “products of a community of researchers”3, and thus focus on 
the potential incommensurability between fields, and the means by which rhetorical 





                                               
3 The Social Construction of Two Biologists Proposals, Greg Myers, 1985. 
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The Inter-disciplinary Incursion of Mathematics into Biology: Mendel and Darwin 
 
James Wynn’s work on the mathematization of biology in his book Evolution by 
the Numbers, offers a compelling account of the rhetorical dimensions of the inter-
disciplinary interactions between mathematics and biology, arguing that the historical 
mathematization of biology was the result in part of the rhetorical efforts of those who 
championed mathematical methods in biology. Wynn claims that mathematical reasoning 
does not argue for itself, and that the epistemological status of mathematical reasoning 
within biology has been in part earned through the rhetorical mediation of 
mathematical/statistical methods across priorly untrodden disciplinary boundaries. 
 Wynn traces the historical challenges faced by figures such as Mendel and Darwin, in 
advocating for mathematical reasoning in the field of biology during moments where 
mathematical reasoning was not paradigmatically privileged in Kuhnian terms. 
Qualifying the claims in John Angus Campbell’s landmark essay in the rhetoric of 
science4 on Darwin, Wynn moves beyond the assertion that Darwin was rhetorician par 
excellence and that The Origin is a fundamentally rhetorical text, to consider both the 
scientific and rhetorical role of mathematics in his theory. Wynn focuses on the rhetorical 
challenges Darwin faced in advancing a quantitative theory of species-origin, given the 
paradigmatic status of biological theorization of organism development. The rhetorically 
animated front-stage of his theory as represented in the published version of The Origin, 
according to Wynn, has obscured the mathematical basis of his theorization of evolution 
                                               
4 Charles Darwin: Rhetorician of Science 
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by natural selection. And in focusing on Darwin’s deliberate championing of 
mathematically supported theorizations of biology, Wynn argues that Darwin should 
properly be understood as both a rhetorician par excellence and a “pioneer of 
mathematical argument in the study of organic phenomena”. Wynn’s analysis of Gregor 
Mendel’s statistical hereditary method shows how Mendel’s theory and the rhetoric 
supporting it operated fundamentally upon an analogy between mathematics and nature. 
The primary sense in which math is seen as rhetorical in Mendel’s case involves the 
audience reception at moments of disciplinary border-crossing, when “mathematical 
arguments, no matter how compelling or analytically robust, compete with a host of other 
beliefs” (22), and Mendel faced the challenge of turning his mathematically structured 
empirical evidence into biologically comprehendible “rational principles”.  
 
Karl Pearson at the Edge of Inter-Disciplinarity 
While Darwin and Mendel used and advocated for the integration of 
mathematical methods into the study of biology and so indicate for Wynn the rhetorical 
challenge of advancing an inter-disciplinary methodology within an unsympathetic 
biological paradigm, his chapter on Karl Pearson, the first “radical disciple” of biometry 
(the statistical approach to biological analysis founded by Francis Galton) moves to the 
edge of inter-disciplinarity. Using Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s concepts of values as 
divisions/virtues and value hierarchies to characterize the two sides of the Mendelian-
biometric debate at the end of 19th century, Wynn builds a dichotomy between Pearson 
and his critic William Bateson that centers on the role of mathematics in biology. While 
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Bateson argued from the position of value as difference, where “multiple methods 
(including mathematics) are required to develop reliable scientific knowledge about 
evolution, variation and heredity” (Wynn, 185), Pearson advocated for the “development 
of a new mathematical biology, guided exclusively in its investigations of evolution and 
heredity, by the principles and practices of mathematics”. Framed within the conceptual 
space of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, “what had previously been distinct but not 
incompatible values (mathematical and other approaches to biology) had suddenly begun 
to aggregate into value hierarchies of competing virtues” (Wynn, 168).  
According to Wynn’s argument, Pearson’s position that biology could be done 
mathematically without experimental approaches, formed a value hierarchy where 
distinct values/approaches were assigned disparate levels of virtue, where “measurement 
and mathematical reasoning is taken as the only means of developing knowledge about 
nature” (187). With this value hierarchy that places the mathematician at the top, “science 
becomes the process of developing and testing mathematical theory through the 
collection of data...organizing the hierarchy of values to place mathematical analysis and 
description as the vanguard of the scientific process”. Two important considerations arise 
out of Wynn’s treatment of Pearson’s biometric program, the first being the question of 
disciplinary interaction and the second being the question of the motive to assign 
mathematics such an ontologically and epistemically privileged status. Bateson and other 
Mendelians saw mathematical approaches as one node in the network of biological 
inquiry, yet Pearson’s value hierarchy solely privileging mathematics presents a 
controversy at the limits of inter-disciplinarity,  and allows us to shift our focus without 
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much difficulty to the case study through which the concept of meta-disciplinarity will be 
primarily framed, that of Gregory Chaitin’s Metabiology.  
 
III. Mathematics, Biology and the Limits of Inter-disciplinarity 
 
Meta-disciplinarity and Metabiology 
Metabiology is the recent foray into theoretical biology (or not, according to his 
critics) by Argentinian-American mathematician, computer scientist and co-founder of 
Algorithmic Information Theory (AIT)5, Gregory Chaitin. Metabiology is a theoretical 
project aimed to provide an indubitable ‘proof’ of Darwinian evolution at the abstract 
level of pure mathematics, arising from the peculiarly discipline-specific observation that 
“if you compare theory in biology with theory in physics, and if you look at biology as a 
mathematician, things are not that convincing...there is empirical evidence of Darwin’s 
theory, but there is no mathematical proof.” (Proving Darwin, 9). Attempting to offer as 
simple an explanation of Metabiology as he can, Chaitin says: “You’ve heard people 
refer to DNA as a computer program? Well, that's the whole idea: to make this metaphor 
into a mathematical theory of evolution.” (PD, 3). So, what makes Chaitin’s 
metabiological project an exemplar of a controversy arising out of a meta-disciplinary 
approach, and for that matter, what exactly is meant by or conveyed in the term “meta-
disciplinary” that isn’t in the aforementioned intra- and inter-disciplinary stagings? The 
term “meta-disciplinarity”, it must be noted, is already being circulated within 
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scholarship, though the extant usage of inter-disciplinary pedagogy expressing what can 
generally be understood as a discipline fostering and guiding inter-disciplinarity, but the 
existing usages of the term indicate a metatheoretical holism with a general, oft-
ambiguous connective tissue spanning through and connecting across a few (or 
potentially all) disciplines. The extant use of the term is consistently organized around a 
pedagogical or methodological drive to increase inter-disciplinarity across disciplines and 
the perspectives they contain. wherever the term is (infrequently found), there is present a 
metaphor of ‘unity through diversity’, or “togetherness-in-difference”6. What I mean by 
meta-disciplinary is quite different if not the inverse of the “togetherness-in-difference” 
sense of meta-disciplinarity, indicating moments when a perceived likeness across 
disciplines moves from the status of a rhetorical figure which may characterize a 
methodological implement or an epistemological goal, to a primary status as ontology, 
rendering one field as philosophically prior to another in a manner that preemptively 
forecloses the kinds of incommensurability encountered in intra/inter-disciplinary 
controversies, but does so by paradoxically and violently inaugurating a new relation of 
“togetherness-in-sameness”. I am not arguing that the previous uses are the wrong usage 
of the stable concept of “meta-disciplinarity”, but rather that Gregory Chaitin’s project of 
                                               
6 Alexander Werth’s Unity in Diversity: The Virtues of a Meta-disciplinary Perspective, distinguishes the 
term from more commonly used concepts like inter-disciplinary or multidisciplinary, by claiming that a 
meta-disciplinary perspective “transcends or supersedes traditional disciplinary boundaries to create a truly 
holistic, systemic, integrative worldview...instead of merely linking two or more customary fields together 
at their margins, a meta-disciplinary focus reveals that all such fields are fundamentally related in 
numerous significant ways” (36). LuMing Mao argues that a meta-disciplinary approach “is informed by an 
outright rejection of any external principle or overarching context to determine the context of the 
other...rely(ing) on terms of interdependence and interconnectivity to constitute and regulate representation 
of all discursive practices” (218). 
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Metabiology indicates an entirely different sense of meta-disciplinarity, one which 
articulates the disciplinary interaction between mathematics and biology in a 
contemporary moment of seemingly cosmic and (yet) synchronic incommensurability 
between the stable concepts of theoretical biology generally and the methodologically 
experimental and philosophically controversial “Metabiology” of Chaitin.  
To return once more to Wynn’s analysis of Pearson, Wynn states that “in this Positivistic 
biology (Pearson’s proto-biometry model), the goals of physics merge with the goals of 
biology. Both disciplines would be interested in describing the widest ranges of 
phenomena in the briefest possible formulae within the routine of perceptual experience” 
(156). And so the connective tissue that both Pearson and Chaitin identify between 
mathematics and physics was crucial to the requisite connections developed between 
mathematics and biology for each thinker. So, we can rightly understand the controversial 
relationship or intersection between mathematics and biology at the ontological level by 
attending to the rhetorical features that would be considered inter-disciplinary between 
math and physics but are combinatorically featured in Chaitin and Pearson’s cases as 
operating at the meta-disciplinary level between mathematics and biology when 
rhetorically oriented towards an ontological hierarchy. Wynn indicates that Pearson 
“maintained, despite his own positivistic convictions, that mathematical reasoning 
unaccompanied by observation or experiment could be used as a legitimate first step to 
developing theories about nature” (156).  
More than a century later, Gregory Chaitin “puts it (more) bluntly” by stating that 
from the perspective of Algorithmic Information Theory, “mathematics and physics are 
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not that different. In both cases, theories are compressions of facts, in one case facts we 
discover in a physics lab, in the other case, numerical facts discovered using a computer” 
(Chaitin, 2007, 303). In fact, we can narrate Chaitin’s broader trajectory from 
Algorithmic Information Theory to Metabiology in large part through the mediatory role 
physics played between pure math and biology for Chaitin. In a 2003 paper titled Leibniz, 
Information, Math and Physics, Chaitin traces the theoretical ancestry of his work in 
Algorithmic Information Theory (AIT), all the way back to Leibniz’s 1686 Discourse on 
Metaphysics, arguing that the philosopher “almost invented algorithmic information 
theory of the sub-field of information theory (AIT) he co-founded in the 1960s alongside 
Ray Solomonoff and Andrey Kolmogorov7, and detailing how it has led to what he sees 




While ‘officially’ unveiling the project of Metabiology in his 2012 book Proving 
Darwin: Making Biology Mathematical, Chaitin was pondering the potential biological 
applications and implications of AIT since he began developing his version of the theory 
late in the 1960s. The final section in his 1977 essay Algorithmic Information Theory 
which first presented his version of the theory was titled “AIT and Biology”, and in it 
Chaitin claims that the “most important” challenge to the theory was the question of if a 
                                               
7 Chaitin, PD, 35-37 
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theoretical mathematical biology could be developed from it. Chaitin cites John Von 
Neumann’s desire to “isolate the basic conceptual problems of biology from the detailed 
physics and biochemistry of life as we know it” (AIT, 357) as the source of his own desire 
to develop a mathematical theory of biology, and to a large degree the Metabiology that 
followed nearly 3 decades later can accurately be understood as a response to the exact 
same desire. In the essay A Mathematical Theory of Evolution and Biological Creativity, 
Chaitin claims he has “something radically new to talk about” and that “the time is now 
ripe to combine theoretical computer science with biology and to begin developing a 
theoretical mathematical biology.” (2) Chaitin rather casually dismisses the lot of 
literature on biology and evolution, saying, “good work, I have nothing against it, but I’m 
going to ignore most of it and go off in a different direction” (2). This different direction 
begins with Chaitin reminding his audience that “Darwin begins his book On the Origin 
of Species by taking advantage of the analogy between artificial selection by animal and 
plant breeders...and natural selection”, and from this insight develops his own rhetorical 
figure: one between “the random evolution of natural software, DNA, and the random 
evolution of artificial software, computer programs.” This is the essence of the new field 
of research proposed by the term Metabiology, meaning Metabiology begins with a 
figure which Chaitin calls an analogy, between the role of information in biological and 
computational settings. Working at an abstract level, Chaitin sees no problem in 
theorizing DNA as a “universal programming language”, a language with the capacity to 
express any algorithm. He cites Richard Dawkin’s work as teaching him that “bodies are 
unimportant, they are just vehicles for their genes” (3), which translates metabiologically 
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to the exclusive focus on “digital software” (genomes) rather than the hardware or bodies 
that are studied in biology. While he is not making explicit ontological claims, there is 
nevertheless an obvious conceit that evolution at its core is explained by software and not 
hardware, which informs his choice to ignore the energetic dimensions of biological life, 
and focus specifically on information. In an appendix in Proving Darwin, Chaitin lists the 
numerous analogies between biology and mathematics that theoretically structure 
Metabiology. Here are some of the more important analogies he makes: 
 
Computer Programming Languages = Artificial digital software  
DNA = Natural Digital Software, Universal Programming Language  
Life = Evolving Software 
Biology = Software Archeology 
Mutation = a program modifying a given organism 
Fitness = integer calculated by an organism 
Evolution = random walk in space of all possible programs towards increasing fitness8 
 
So, as a methodological choice (though an ontological orientation is present as well) 
Metabiology would, in Chaitin’s own words, “throw away the body and just keep the 
DNA” He cites Richard Dawkin’s work as teaching him that “bodies are unimportant, 
they are just vehicles for their genes” (3), which translates metabiologically to the 
exclusive focus on “digital software” (genomes) rather than the hardware or bodies that 
are studied in biology. DNA as natural software or universal programming language is 
made the unilateral agency in organism evolution,  and Chaitin is not shy about feature of 
his theory, but he occasionally makes an effort to explain it as a methodological choice 
                                               
8 PD, 5-6 
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resulting from the epistemological goals of Metabiology as a toy-model9 simplification of 
biology at a highly abstracted level. And yet, in the immediately following explanation of 
the rationale behind the choice, it not clear if he is speaking in the register of metaphysics 
(ontology), methodology or epistemology: “biologists think that every detail counts; they 
do not distinguish between what is fundamental and what is secondary…the energetics, 
the metabolism of living organisms is unimportant, all that counts is the information” 
(MTE).  
Paradoxically, Chaitin occasionally implies in the same context that this choice is 
in, (some large) part the result of his apprehension/appreciation of a paradigm shift 
towards a digital philosophy that displaces matter and energy with information as the 
essential ontological unit of the universet. Chaitin in 1977 claims that what will 
eventually become his Metabiology can help to solve a “fundamental problem of 
theoretical biology”: “to set up a nondeterministic model universe, to formally define 
what it means for a reigon of space-time in that universe to be an organism and what is its 
degree of organization, and to rigorously demonstrate that, starting from simple initial 
conditions, organisms will appear and evolve in degree or organization in a reasonable 
amount of time and with high probability.”10 Chaitin’s resultant theory of Metabiology 
can be understood as an attempt at setting up the aforementioned “nondeterministic 
model universe(s)” in an effort to elaborate a general mathematical account of Darwinian 
                                               
9 Though he does on multiple occasions qualify his project by indicating its status as a toy-model, the 
condition of Metabiology’s possibility as even a toy-model (rather than a mathematical fiction completely 
unrelated to biological reality) is the result of an implicit acceptance of a digital ontology.  
10 Chaitin (1977), 357 
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evolution that begins from elegant simplicity and leads (potentially) to infinite 
complexity. 
Regarding a definition of life, Chaitin cites the definition given by Maynard Smith 
and Szathmary, which in his understanding can be simplified into the claim that “you have 
life when there is heredity with mutations and evolution by natural selection can take 
place.” (4). This definition allows Chaitin to at least in theory search for the simplest, most 
elegant system that displays heredity and mutations that provably evolves. So, to make 
things “as simple as possible”, Chaitin says, “no metabolism, no bodies, only DNA. My 
organisms will be computer programs” (4). If Darwin developed his theory of natural 
selection from an “analogical” movement from the artificial selection of animal husbandry 
to the natural selection of biological mutations in response to the evolutionary pressure of 
survival, than as Chaitin sees it, if he can algorithmically model the “evolutionary pressure” 
given in Darwinian evolution that occupies a middle ground between top-down deductive 
intelligent design and completely random and non-modular mutation, he will have a 









Algorithmic Information Theory 
While a comprehensive account of this related conversation beyond the scope of 
this paper, it suffices for my purposes to outline the basic features of AIT and how 
Chaitin saw it leading to biology and the related paradigm shift. AIT avoids probability 
distributions, unlike traditional statistics and information theory, and rather defines 
randomness through algorithmic compressibility, meaning the fundamental measure of 
randomness is whether an algorithm can compress any of the information, produce a 
theory simpler than the phenomena it describes, which Chaitin argues any good theory 
must be. Algorithmic or program-size complexity is a measure that quantifies algorithmic 
randomness. AIT thus “studies the size in bits of the smallest program to compute 
something”11, and the initial insight that led Chaitin to develop it was that “a scientific 
theory is a computer program that calculates the observations, and that the smaller the 
program is, the better the theory”. 
With the equation “theory = program -> Computer -> output = experimental 
data”12 in place, Chaitin developed a theory of randomness based on program-size 
complexity that presents an information-theoretic reiteration of Godel’s incompleteness 
that re-stipulates the disciplinary relationship between math and physics, as “in both 
cases understanding is compression, and is measured by the extent to which empirical 
data and mathematical theorems are respectively compressed into concise physical laws 
or mathematical axioms, both of which are embodied in computer software.” (LIMP, 3).  
                                               
11 Chaitin, Metaphysics, Metamathematics, Metabiology (MMM), (7) 
12 Leibniz, Information, Math and Physics (LIMP), 1  
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This work on AIT, for Chaitin, demonstrates the paradigm shift away from the old 
mathematics of formal axiomatic theory, showing “how badly mistaken (David) Hibert 
was to assume that a fixed formal axiomatic theory could encompass all of mathematics” 
(LIMP, 8). This is the essence of what is termed in Metabiology the postmodern of 
“postmodern mathematics” as it takes seriously and incorporates the philosophical 
implications of Godel’s and Turing’s exposure of mathematical incompleteness 
(undecidability). According to Chatin, traditional pure mathematicians rely on a “sunday 
school fiction” of mathematical certainty implying absolute truth, and so have much to 
gain by ignoring or bookmarking the philosophically troubling implications of 
incompleteness for mathematics understood in the Aristotelian sense as a-rhetorical, 
creatively restrained and strictly logical13. Chaitin is a self-described heretic in this sense, 
claiming that mathematics requires a sense of creativity, meaning that mathematics is not 
a mechanistic, closed system, but rather an open system that requires creativity. 
 
Chaitin’s Mathematical Creativity 
Chaitin’s mutlifaceted treatment of “creativity” as equivalent across mathematical 
and biological contexts is one example that indicates how Chaitin’s particular 
mathematical ontology is idiosyncratic should be at least partially accounted for14 to 
understand Chatin’s meta-disciplinary staging of biology and pure mathematics. One way 
                                               
13 “no one uses fine language when teaching geometry” (Rhetoric, III, 1) 
14 Though to provide both a full account and a comprehensive rhetorical analysis of all of Chaitin’s 
peculiar thoughts on mathematics is beyond the scope of this project. 
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of getting at how Chaitin understands the term is by considering the role of the Busy 
Beaver Function (BB Function) in Metabiology.  
Chatin “compares the natural creativity of the biosphere to a different type of 
creativity, namely that inscribed in the essence of mathematics...the creative potential 
inherit to mathematics is considered to be well rendered by the BB Function.”15 Stated 
simply, the Busy Beaver Problem is that of “concisely naming an extremely large 
positive integer, an extremely large unsigned whole number” (5). Why, according to 
Chaitin, this is both a problem and a solution in Metabiology is that to even get to the 
point at which such a large unsigned whole number can be conceived of and considered 
requires mathematical creativity. Chaitin frames the matter by supposing “you have a 
large number N and you want to name a larger number. You can go from N to N + N, to 
N times N, to N to the Nth power, to N raised to the Nth of the Nth N times. So to name 
large numbers you have to invent addition, multiplication, exponentiation, hyper-
exponentiation, and this requires creativity” (5). If a single “bit” of biological information 
and a complex biological organism are considered in their relations to one another 
analogously to how the number N, and the expression of N raised to the Nth of the Nth N 
times relate, then the concept of “creativity” is equivalent in both mathematical and 
biological terms, meaning one expresses a feature of the other, and so we have a clearly 
figural rhetoric that renders in its expression the convertibility between biological and 
mathematical accounts of organism development. Crucial to this moment of bio-
                                               
15 Siedlinski, 138 
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mathematical conversion is the fact that the BB Function for Chaitin gives an (at least 
theoretically) expression of how Turing’s halting problem plays in his metabilogy, since 
BB(N) grows faster than any computable function of N. In other words, the non-
computable infinity of the BB Function is itself only grasped by moments creatively 
(finite) calculation, which offers a kind of philosophical structure to Chaitin’s theory: this 
computational figure offers a kind of middle ground between a completely random theory 
of evolutionary creativity, a “brainless exhaustive search, in which the previous organism 
A is ignored and we try a new organism B at random (without any input)”, and intelligent 
design.  
In these two modelings of evolutionary processes, the problems of memory and 
mutation are distinctly problematic. In intelligent design, evolution cannot be properly 
considered a functional agency itself, as generational finitude or other arbitrary material 
factors would be the only conditions separating the simple from the complex, unfit and fit 
organisms from one another, as a teleological end is operative in fundamentally 
sequencing any mutation from one level of simplicity to another more complex level. 
Therefore, both the simple, unfit organisms and the complex, fit organisms are defined by 
the same entelechial standard of pre-defined optimal fitness related to a telos. This would 
make evolution a contingent rather than necessary factor for biological organisms.  
On the other hand, a strictly mathematical calculation demonstrates the inadequacy of 
models of exhaustive random searching, which prevents any kind of biological memory 
leading to informatic modularity: “the human genome has 3x10^9 bases, but in four 
billion years the biosphere has only been able to try an infinitesimal fraction of the 
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astronomical number 4x10^9” (7). In between these two Chaitin articulates the essential 
posture of Metabiology, where “each of (his) software organisms calculates a single 
number, a single positive integer, and the bigger the number, the fitter the organism”. The 
unbounded process of increasing fitness that Chaitin demonstrates in theory is the 
successful component of metabilogy as Chaitin sees it: “this is my current best effort to 
find the Platonic ideal of evolution, the simplest, most natural system that exhibits 
creativity and that I can prove evolves by random natural selection.” In a more general 
sense, Chaitin sees his metabiological project as a incomplete but generative movement 
away from the conventional mathematical models in biology which “talk about stability 
and fixed points, (but) not about creativity” (11). As he sees it, “in biology nothing is 
static, everything is dynamic...biology is ceaseless creativity, not stability, not at all” 
(11). 
Chaitin implicates Kuhn within his own philosophical views on science, arguing 
that “Kuhnian paradigm shifts are not limited to the experimental sciences, they also take 
place in mathematics, supposedly an a priori discipline, a necessary tool of thought.” ( 
PD, 88). As would happen, he goes on to argue that his project of Metabiology has 
inaugurated a Kuhnian paradigm shift all its own, one which proceeds from the claim that 
“pure math is even more biological than biology, which is very complicated but only has 
finite complexity” (32). Chaitin’s attempt to provide a formal mathematical proof of 
Darwinian evolution, according to him, has placed him within a rich intellectual tradition 
of what he terms “postmodern mathematics”: “Godel, Turing, (Emil) Post and Von 
Neumann opened a door from math to biology; they gave us the necessary conceptual 
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tool-kit.”. What we need, Chaitin claims, to enter this door and enter this new 
information-based paradigm, is “postmodern discrete algorithmic math to understand 
biology, not Newtonian differential equations, not old math, not analysis” (34). The 
paradigm shift presumed by Chaitin is that of the movement from an ontology of energy 
and matter to an ontology of information, a digital ontology of discretization (as opposed 
to an analogue ontology emphasizing continuity) that sees the universe as a universal 
turing machine. How this digital ontology rhetorically operates in Chaitin’s project is 
that, in positing a qualitatively homogenous digital ontology that equally implicated in 
both pure mathematics and biological reality, the epistemic domains of, and boundaries 
between pure mathematics and biology are respectively integrated and dissolved, which 
grants (if his meta-disciplinary pre-structuring is accepted)  Chaitin the ability to enact a 
methodology that circumvents the issue of simulation16 and can transpose mathematical 
proofs directly into the register of bio-ontology.  
The aforementioned analogy Chaitin deploys in his theoretical staging that 
renders qualitative equivalency between “creativity” in biological evolution and the 
creativity Chaitin finds in pure mathematics (for epistemic expansion or the discovery of 
                                               
16 Epistemically and methodologically, simulations place upon an inter-disciplinary bio-computational 
theory the demand that it be developed and deployed within a context (software space) that simulates (or at 
least attempts to model) the reality conditions in the observable biosphere, such as limited space, resources 
and time. This generally limits to some degree the computational/mathematical content to a instrumental 
role, where in Chaitin’s case the mathematics takes on a far more robust conceptual (and here argued, 
ontological) role in the broader theory.  However, from a epistemic and/or methodological perspective, the 
demand of simulation is conservative and constructive in its attempt to delimit mathematical abstraction 
from biological reality, though from a rhetorical perspective, simulations do rather the opposite, visually 
encouraging the conclusion that biology is ultimately reducible to mathematical expressions, and can be (at 
least in potential) completely simulated in silico.  
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novel mathematical concepts or objects to occur) comes to function as a rather esoteric 
defense for his metabiological methodology of mathematical proof over computer 
simulation. Given the postmodern condition of mathematics, Chaitin need not fear or 
pejorate the idea of randomness, and his Metabiology treats randomness as the condition 
of possibility for creativity, embracing randomness theoretically and methodologically. 
Since Metabiology is essentially the “mathematical expression of the interaction between 
randomness and uncomputability giving rise to novelty, increasing conceptual complexity 
in the form of new information content”17. So, analogically speaking, excursions into 
randomness, experiments of the metabiological variety, are themselves performaces of 
mathematical creativity rather than simulations of creativity indicating definitions or 
descriptions of creativity. You see, for Chaitin, we can only be creative in doing, and 
cannot intellectually know creativity outside of its performance, “creativity is by 
definition something we don’t know how to do” he says, we don’t wake up and say “I am 
going to be creative” and then are, but rather discover creativity after the fact (this is a 
variation/adaptation of the maxim that one cannot be conscious and know consciousness 
in the abstract). And that is really what Chaitin hopes his Metabiology will achieve, if not 
now, at some point, through its random (creative) walks in software space. The 
productive trajectory of Metabiology as a field/discipline is left in a profoundly 
vulnerable position, hinging quite literally upon the rhetorical characterization of 
randomness as either a leap into uncharted, exciting and epistemically generative 
                                               
17 Virginia Chaitin, A Philosophical Perspective on a Metatheory of Biological Evolution (2016).  
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territory, or the falling into a lack of purpose, intelligence, meaning, and thus coherence 
with the biological world. The rhetorical difference between the two determines if one 
sees Metabiology as valuable (either theoretically or experimentally) or if one sees it as 
leading to an intellectual no man’s land, a surreal or fictional world of mathematical 
fantasies.  
Chaitin’s Critics 
Let us now consider Chaitin’s critics and consider the incommensurabilities they 
erect to dismiss Metabiology or distance it from real theoretical biology. According to 
Polish Scholar Radoslaw Siedlinski, Chaitin’s Metabiology is highly controversial and 
problematic, for both computer scientists and biologists, since (he claims) the 
computational theory Chaitin makes use of is strictly theoretical, meaning it cannot be 
applied to any existent hardware, or be modeled in any existent programming language, 
and his treatment of biological information is seen by biologists as simplistic to a fault 
and highly “genocentric”, focusing only on the information contained in genomes and not 
the physical systems that harbor said “information”18All in all, we can roughly posit four  
problematic aspects of Metabiology, two from the perspective of mathematics or 
computer science, two from the perspective of biology. From the math/computer science 
angle, the first “problem” with Metabiology is the fact that the procedures he describes 
are accessible only in the domain of pure mathematics, as they involve the use of an 
“oracle”, which solves the halting problem theoretically but is uncomputable on any 
                                               
18 Turing Machines and Evolution: A Critique of Chaitin’s Metabiology 
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existing hardware, and cannot be modeled or implemented within any existing 
programming languages. Closely related, the second issue of unlimited resources 
“equip(s) the evolving organisms-programs with infinite computing resources...things 
that do exist in reality, or are unknowable.” (Siedlinski, 141). 
Both of these issues are explicitly acknowledged by Chaitin, who carefully hedges 
any and all conclusions/implications to be made from Metabiology through this caveat, 
there is the invitation for rhetorical analysis, Siedlinski and others19 suggest that he 
harbors a suppressed philosophical faith in his theory that denies the sincerity of his 
caveats. From the position of biology, the indicated problems with Metabiology are its 
directionality which imbricates a strong teleology within Chaitin’s theory, and “the 
discrepancy between Chaitin’s assumptions and the findings of modern evolutionary 
biology” (142), which to biologists renders Chaitin’s model simplified and unrealistic. 
Ewert, Dembski and Marks paper concludes that “while elegant in conception, 
Metabiology departs from reality because it pays no attention to resource limitations” (8).  
I argue that there is really just one critique present at the base of these various critiques, 
that “it isn’t real… it does not cohere with or meet basic reality conditions of biology”. I 
would further argue that it is spurious to claim that these are critiques are or would be 
coming from computer scientists or mathematicians themselves. It is ironic but not 
surprising that in the section of the essay that claims to present problems with the theory 
“from the point of view of a mathematician or computer scientist” (140), the only 
                                               
19 Ewert, Dembski and Marks. Active Information in Metabiology. 
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computer scientist/mathematician Siedlinski quotes is Chaitin himself. The use of Oracles 
is not “controversial” unless you are implying an ontological relationship to biological 
reality, as the analogy in translation across disciplines would imply an evolutionary 
theory that is guided by some intelligence. Claiming there is a coder behind the code or a 
programmer behind the program is only controversial if the code is now DNA or the 
programs are now mutations, literally. But do Chaitin’s critics clarify whether he is 
claiming that DNA = programming language in his theory or in the world his theory 
exists within? I have already indicated in a variety of ways that Chaitin suggests both and 
it is not clear how he himself truly values his theory. These critics end up positing brick-
wall incommensurability between Metabiology and fields that are part of and used within 
Metabiology itself, which is erroneous.  
The meta-disciplinary orientation is the issue, not the mathematics and computer 
science Chaitin uses; Chaitin is good at math. In posing this brick wall 
incommensurability. they so project an extraneous and curious impetus to strip 
Metabiology of its use to any scientific discipline and render it a fantasy, leaving Chaitin 
and his theory on an abandoned disciplinary island to stave. As the critics see it, they 
have no obligation to help Chaitin and risk the same fate, as Chaitin’s project was 
oriented around this deliberate jumping into randomness and thus meaninglessness, 
which he mistook for creativity. What if there was another way to deny Chaitin his 
ontology while remaining intellectually generous and humble in light of a complicated 





III. Conclusion: Rhetoric (in) and Mathematics 
 
 
Infinitesimals and Mathematical Creativity 
 
A final detour back into (perhaps just barely) inter-disciplinary rhetorical 
scholarship, this time dealing specifically with the relationship between rhetoric and 
mathematics, may help to further clarify the sense of “creativity” that Chaitin renders 
equivalent across disciplinary and philosophical boundaries, as well the broader 
metadisciplianry staging enacted in Chaitin’s project. G. Mitchell Reyes’s rhetorical 
scholarship on mathematics (footnote) argues that there is good reason for mathematics to 
be attended to by rhetoricians both in its communicative constraints across disciplines, its 
inherent status as a form of knowledge, and its relationship with rhetoric. Arguing that 
when rhetorical scholarship does (infrequently) consider mathematics, it is more often 
than not occupied with the “strategies between mathematicians and the rhetorical 
influence of mathematics in other discursive fields”. Through this observation, Reyes 
identifies a theoretical gap in the field’s treatment of mathematics, in which the 
“argumentative logics that constitute mathematics’ productive vocabulary remain 
unquestioned”. In this way, Reyes argument can be incorporated into the conversation 
surrounding Metabiology and meta-disciplinarity, as Reye’s efforts to focus on the 
“argumentative logics that constitute mathematics’ productive vocabularies” indicate (in 
this argument) a particular instance of a broader desire to move extra-disciplinary focused 
rhetorical scholarship from an inter-disciplinary to a meta-disciplinary perspective, and 
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further helps us address the convoluted figural features that theoretically permit and 
rhetorically empower Chaitin’s meta-disciplinary absorption of biology into pure 
mathematics.  
An example of this meta-disciplinary focus can be seen in his argument about the 
role of rhetoric Leibniz’s and Newton’s work with infinitesimals, which he analyzes 
through his theory of two operative “planes” of what we can call rhetoric, the familiar (to 
rhetoric of science) plane of “situated rhetoric characterized by criticism, debate, and 
response.”, and the less considered plane where (rhetorical) “discursive formations give 
shape and substance to” novel mathematical concepts. Calling the former “situational” 
and the later “constitutive”, he sees Newton and Leibniz’s work with infinitesimals as 
instances in which it is crucially “the persuasive arguments” which constitute the 
substance of infinitesimals as non-empirical, and non-representational mathematical 
objects. Reyes introduces the concept of the infinitesimal through the Newton and 
Leibniz's development of integral and differential calculus, which was capable of 
studying the movement of objects through space, and represents one of the crucial 
historical and theoretical contributions to mathematics generally. They did this through 
the use of infinitesimals, and this is reflected in their new calculus initially being titled 
"infinitesimal calculus", where the area under a curved line is broken down into an 
infinite number of rectangles, which renders the curve into a sequence of straight lines.  
From this, argues that the status of the infinitesimal as non-representational and non-
empirical, meant that it “did not have immediate recourse to an already established set of 
discursive rules” and could not be represented geometrically or physically.  
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Though Reyes does thoroughly engage the rhetorical situations Leibniz and 
Newton were faced with given the status of their audiences, doing so leads him to argue 
not simply that scientific and mathematical concepts can and do transform thought, but 
that “such a concept (the infinitesimal) is wholly rhetorical”, finding “its substance” to be 
almost exclusively “in the rhetorical arguments circulating around” (181). Reyes goes 
beyond many prior rhetorical considerations of mathematical invention by focusing on 
the “constitutive rhetoric” that is implicated in the development of novel mathematical 
ideas.  
We cannot completely accept and incorporate all of Reyes claims about the 
relationship between rhetoric and mathematics in general without qualifying that there is 
an extent to which, in terms of the theoretical framework I am here deploying, Reyes’ 
argument that mathematical concepts and/or objects can be wholly constituted through 
rhetoric(al figures) can be seen itself to risk a (perhaps mild) form of meta-disciplinary 
violence in restipulating one field (or crucial concepts within) entirely though the 
substance of another, in particular moments of presumed incommensurability. Rather we 
can adopt a slightly constrained version of his claims and argue that while Chaitin’s 
mathematical concepts outside of the meta-disciplinary gamut of Metabiology cannot 
reasonably be understood to be wholly or primarily constituted through rhetoric(al 
figures)20 within the (meta)disciplinary matrix of Chaitin’s project the role that Chatin’s 
                                               
20 The cannonical status of earlier work in AIT is uncontroversial for both information theorists and 
computer scientists, and his work has further been generativity taken up in various theoretical physics 
contexts, and it would be absurd to narrate this entire legacy through the impetus of rhetoric and in this 
particular deployment. 
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mathematical concepts (and attached philosophical beliefs informing the meta-
disciplinary seizure of biology’s ontology) embody and perform very important rhetorical 
goals, and the dialogical placement of concepts equally within abstract mathematical and 
biological contexts is itself the result of the kind of constitutive rhetoric arguably similar 
to what Reyes finds operative in his treatment of Newton and Leibniz’s work with 
infinitesimals. And further, Reye’s rhetorical take on mathematical novelty can perhaps 
help to expand and indicate with more clarity what exactly Chatin is really saying in his 
“analogy” between mathematical creativity and the kind of creativity seen in the 
productive processes and products of biological evolution, perhaps its more intellectually 
appropriate and generative to consider Chaitin’s meta-disciplinary leaps as having a 
constitutively rhetorical ingredient in them, if we also posit this rhetoricity within the 
creativity that mathematics demonstrates through novel conceptualizations (ex. 
infinitesimal calculus or Metabiology’s use of AIT), and as a feature of the  





What the notion of meta-disciplinarity indicates in the case of Chaitin’s 
Metabiology is that the controversy, (if there is any, which of course depends on who you 
ask), is controversial due to Chaitin’s treatment of entire disciplines (and the semantic 
communities therein)  in relation to one another: he does not signal or indicate when his 
analogy between two different things (computational and biological information) 
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becomes a metonymy that renders biology qualitatively indistinguishable from pure 
mathematics21 and instead differentiates the disciplines through a reduced quantitative 
disparity between relative amounts of complexity (again, math is more biological than 
biology). The case of Metabiology here presented indicates a post-incommensurability 
centered scientific rhetoric, where an unchecked inter-disciplinary impulse and an 
analogy across disciplines becomes an ontology that connects the “essence” of both 
biology and pure mathematics at a level that is controversial in its meta-framing of the 
disciplines themselves. Chaitin’s Metabiology, I argue, presents the kind of disciplinary 
violence that rhetoricians of science should themselves be weary of, as it conceals its 
imperialistic disciplinary rhetoric through an optimistic image of mutually beneficial 
inter-disciplinary exchanges, of terms, concepts, and/or ideas. However, the inaugural 
exigency of Metabiology is precisely the result of a meta-disciplinary staging in the first 
place: Chaitin, as a mathematician, sees a lacking in theoretical biology according to the 
standards of his own respective field’s epistemic standards, and the ontological 
assumptions that underwrite them (a quasi-platonic mathematical real precedes and 
animates material biological reality): Darwinian evolution demands proof at the abstract 
level of pure mathematics, as an expression in pure math would secure the theory beyond 
the shadow of any doubt, at least from the perspective of mathematicians. Chaitin 
attempts to inaugurate an entire field of inquiry without preserving the “demarcation 
claims” of biology, which fully embraces mathematical methods at the inter-disciplinary 
                                               
21 More specifically the inaccessible realm of algorithmic information theory Chaitin is using in the toy-
model. 
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level but does not translate the efficacy of mathematical methodologies into a final 
philosophical hierarchy that renders biological reality but an effect of an ontologically 
prior mathematical creativity. The warning of disciplinary imperialism lurking behind 
inter-disciplinary exchanges offered by Chaitin’s Metabiology is matched with an 
invitation to further engage mathematics from the position of rhetoric, and there is a 
sense in which Chaitin’s argument for the necessity of creativity in mathematics, invites 
scholars of rhetoric to further pursue the intersection of rhetorical invention and 
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